2. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY (pp. 39-46)

2.1 SCOPE (pp. 39-43)

The report focuses on the Israeli authorities’ policies and actions in the occupied Gaza Strip (Gaza) in the context of the military offensive launched following the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups (p. 39). Its primary aim is to assess these actions within the framework of genocide under international law to determine if Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide (p. 39). This contributes to ongoing international debates and aims to stop/prevent genocidal acts in the short term, and support accountability in the long term (p. 39). The report builds on analyses by other entities like scholars, UN experts, and South Africa’s ICJ case, which have also examined Israel’s conduct through a genocide lens (p. 39).

To make a determination on genocide, Amnesty International (AI) examined:

  • Whether Palestinians in Gaza constitute a protected group (national, ethnical, racial, or religious) under the Genocide Convention (p. 40).
  • Three specific prohibited acts: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (p. 40).
  • Whether Israel committed these acts with the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, [the] group, as such” (p. 40).
  • The legal analysis was guided by extensive research on genocidal intent and engagement with external legal experts (p. 40).

This report builds on AI’s existing documentation of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in Gaza, including previous findings on war crimes like direct and indiscriminate attacks, torture, wanton destruction, and collective punishment (p. 40). AI has previously concluded Israel’s system of oppression and domination against Palestinians amounts to the crime against humanity of apartheid (p. 41).

The research primarily covers the period between October 2023 and July 2024, focusing on the ground situation during this nine-month period (p. 41). Key overarching data (deaths, injuries, damage, food insecurity, displacement) were updated until late September or early October 2024, and analysis of relevant international commentary was updated until the end of November 2024 (p. 41). The report acknowledges that Israel’s offensive continued beyond this research period (p. 41).

The geographical scope is limited to Gaza, considering Palestinians in Gaza as a substantial part of the broader Palestinian group (p. 42). It does not address Israeli violations in the occupied West Bank (though these are subject to separate investigation) (p. 42). It also does not focus on the violations perpetrated by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups against Israelis on 7 October 2023, for which AI has published preliminary research and plans a forthcoming report (p. 42). However, it refers to violations by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups where their conduct is relevant to the report’s analysis of Israeli actions (p. 43). The legal assessment of genocide is under the framework of state responsibility, not individual criminal responsibility (p. 43).

2.2 METHODOLOGY (pp. 43-46)

2.2.1 RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (pp. 43-44) The report is based on field and desk research conducted between 7 October 2023 and early July 2024 (p. 43). AI’s requests for access to Gaza have been repeatedly rejected by Israeli authorities since 2012 (latest rejection 3 June 2024) and by Egyptian authorities for access via Rafah (latest request 24 October 2024) (p. 43).

AI interviewed 212 people (some multiple times) between October 2023 and September 2024, including:

  • Palestinian victims, survivors, and witnesses of air strikes, displacement, detention, destruction of property, and impact of aid restrictions (p. 43).
  • Members of local authorities in Gaza, Palestinian healthcare workers, and individuals involved in the humanitarian response (staff of international, Israeli, and Palestinian NGOs and UN agencies) (p. 43). Most interviews were conducted remotely (voice/video calls) with individuals in Gaza (one in Egypt), relying on trusted Gaza-based fieldworkers to identify and locate them, and sometimes to facilitate communication (p. 43). Interviews with Palestinian victims, witnesses, medical workers, and local authorities were in Arabic and translated by AI (p. 44).

AI analyzed an extensive range of visual and digital evidence (satellite imagery, videos, photos from social media or obtained directly), which were authenticated and, where possible, geolocated (p. 44). It reviewed numerous media reports, statements, datasets from UN agencies (OCHA, UNRWA, WHO), humanitarian organizations, and Palestinian/Israeli human rights groups (p. 44). Statements by senior Israeli government and military officials, COGAT, submissions to Israeli courts, and ICJ case material were also examined (p. 44). Oral statements were reviewed in their original language, with official English translations checked for discrepancies (p. 44).

2.2.2 ENGAGEMENT WITH ISRAELI AND HAMAS AUTHORITIES (pp. 45-46) AI repeatedly attempted to engage with Israeli authorities since October 2023 (p. 45).

  • Submitted findings on 15 air strikes to the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) in five correspondences (Oct 2023 - May 2024) and renewed requests for information in October 2024 (p. 45).
  • The October 2024 letter to the MoD also summarized findings on destruction of cultural/religious sites and conditions of life in Gaza (p. 45).
  • Sent letters to the Knesset Speaker and Military Advocate General (MAG) (Feb 2024) regarding potentially genocidal or dehumanizing statements by Knesset members and military officers, with a follow-up to the MAG (Oct 2024) about soldier statements/conduct (p. 45).
  • Sent a letter to the Israeli Attorney General (Oct 2024) regarding investigations into incitement by senior officials (p. 45).
  • Sent a letter to the MAG (July 2024) regarding destruction of agricultural land and civilian buildings near the border fence (p. 46).
  • Sent a request to COGAT (July 2024) for detailed data on humanitarian aid access (p. 46).
  • No substantive responses were received from Israeli authorities by the time of publication (p. 46).

AI also wrote to Hamas authorities:

  • To the Attorney General in Gaza (July 2024) regarding alleged presence of armed group fighters in IDP camps, and again (Oct 2024) requesting information on investigations into IHL violations by Palestinian armed groups (p. 46). No reply by publication (p. 46).
  • To Hamas’s Political and International Relations Department (Oct 2024) sharing initial findings on Hamas fighters’ conduct in Gaza and requesting information on measures to protect civilians and investigate violations. A 10-page response was received on 13 November 2024, and key elements are reflected in the report (p. 46).

2.2.3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (p. 46) AI expressed gratitude to all participants, especially Palestinians in Gaza, and acknowledged the work of its fieldworkers under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions (p. 46).