That is a very important and logical question to undeestand the genocide. The act of issuing evacuation orders might seem contradictory to an intent to commit genocide, however, Amnesty International’s report addresses this by focusing on the nature, implementation, and consequences of these evacuation orders, rather than taking them at face value as purely protective measures.

Here’s how the report explains this apparent contradiction and argues that the evacuation orders, in the way they were carried out, actually contributed to the alleged genocidal act of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”:

1. Nature of the Evacuation Orders and “Safe Zones”:
   • Unsafe and Unlivable Destinations: The report details that Palestinians were ordered to evacuate to areas that were themselves unsafe, often subsequently bombed, and lacked the most basic infrastructure to support life for the hundreds of thousands (eventually millions) displaced (pp. 24, 132, 137-138, 141-142). These “humanitarian zones” or “safe zones” were often overcrowded, unsanitary, and without adequate food, water, shelter, or medical facilities (pp. 24, 132-133, 137-138).
   • Confusing and Inadequate Warnings: Orders were often sweeping, incomprehensible to the local population, misleading, arbitrary, and given with little notice, creating panic and chaos and forcing people to flee in precarious conditions (pp. 24, 132, 136-138, 140-141). The system of dividing Gaza into blocks for evacuation was often incomprehensible to residents (p. 141).
   • Repeated Displacement: Civilians were forced to move multiple times, often into ever-shrinking pockets of land, as areas previously designated for evacuation were later targeted or became subject to new evacuation orders (pp. 12, 24, 132, 143).
2. Evacuations as Contributing to Deadly Conditions:
   • Creating Catastrophic Conditions: By forcing a massive population into small, ill-equipped areas, the report argues that Israel created the conditions for a humanitarian catastrophe. The extreme overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and insufficient clean water led to the rapid spread of diseases (pp. 22, 132, 190, 193-194). The inability to access food in these areas, or for aid to reach them, led to severe hunger and malnutrition (pp. 21, 132, 187-189).
   • “Slow Death”: The report suggests these conditions were calculated to lead to a “slow death” for the Palestinian population in Gaza (pp. 22, 30, 200). The evacuations, in this context, are not seen as a protective measure but as a mechanism that concentrated the population in areas where their survival was made impossible.
   • Foreseeable Consequences: Amnesty International argues that the devastating humanitarian impact of these mass displacements into areas unprepared to receive such numbers was foreseeable and known to the Israeli authorities (pp. 32, 213). The report states, “Israel implemented these orders in the full knowledge that people could not seek safety by leaving the territory” (p. 134).
3. Intent to Destroy:
   • Not Genuine Protection: The report concludes that “rather than protecting the civilian population, as claimed by the Israeli authorities, these repeated orders contributed to the infliction of conditions of life calculated to destroy Palestinians in Gaza” (p. 24).
   • Confining Palestinians: The report suggests the evacuation orders “were clearly designed to confine Palestinians to an ever smaller and more inhospitable area of Gaza, with insufficient humanitarian aid and other essentials, and thus to intentionally cause mass displacement under inhuman and unliveable conditions” (p. 35).
   • Part of a Broader Pattern: The evacuation orders are not viewed in isolation but as part of a broader pattern of conduct that includes the destruction of essential infrastructure and the severe restriction of humanitarian aid, all of which collectively point to an intent to destroy the group (pp. 31, 213-214).
   • Questionable Right to Return: There
4. Legal Interpretation of Genocide:
   • The crime of genocide includes “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention) (p. 88). This act does not necessarily require immediate mass killing but can involve creating circumstances that lead to the group’s demise over time.
   • Amnesty International argues that the way the evacuations were conducted – forcing people into unlivable conditions where they faced hunger, disease, and further attacks – fits this definition of a genocidal act.

5. Evacuations Without a Right or Feasible Means of Return:

• Permanent Displacement as a Condition of Life: The report highlights that Palestinians displaced by evacuation orders, particularly from northern Gaza to the south, were often not allowed to return to their homes, even after active hostilities in those areas supposedly ceased or diminished (pp. 25, 140). As of 30 September 2024, those displaced from north of Wadi Gaza had not been allowed to go home (p. 25, 140).
• Creating Unlivable “Empty” Zones: The denial of return, coupled with the massive destruction of homes and infrastructure in evacuated areas (pp. 23, 128), effectively rendered these areas unlivable. This contributes to the argument that Israel was inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group, not just temporarily moving them for safety, but potentially aiming for a more permanent demographic change or making large swathes of Gaza uninhabitable for Palestinians.
• Confining the Population: The report states that Israel’s repeated mass “evacuation” orders, coupled with its failure to allow temporary relocation to other parts of the OPT or to enter Israel, “were clearly designed to confine Palestinians to an ever smaller and more inhospitable area of Gaza” (p. 35). The inability to return to their original areas of residence is a key part of this confinement.
• Intent to Destroy the Group in a Specific Area: If a significant portion of a protected group is forcibly and permanently displaced from their homes and lands, and prevented from returning, especially when those areas are then made unlivable, it can be argued that this is part of an intent to destroy the group as such in that specific geographical part of their territory. The destruction of their homes, communities, and way of life in those areas contributes to the destruction of the group itself in that locale.
• Recommendations for Return: Amnesty International explicitly calls on Israel to “allow all Palestinians forcibly displaced since 7 October 2023 to return to their areas of residence or any other areas of their choosing in Gaza, including to the area north of Wadi Gaza” (pp. 36, 285). This recommendation underscores that the denial of return is a significant issue of concern.
• “Netzarim Corridor”: The establishment of the “Netzarim Corridor” which physically cut off northern Gaza from the south (pp. 59, 140) and through which return was blocked or extremely perilous, is presented as a concrete measure preventing return and perpetuating displacement (pp. 59, 140).

Essentially, Amnesty International’s argument is that the evacuation orders were not a genuine attempt to protect civilians that unfortunately failed, but rather a deliberate policy that, in its execution and consequences, was a key component in creating unlivable conditions for Palestinians in Gaza, consistent with an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. The appearance of providing a way out was overshadowed by the reality of where people were forced to go and the conditions they faced there.

According to the report:

1. Hamas’s Conduct and Civilian Endangerment:
   • The report acknowledges that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups at times operated in or from the vicinity of densely populated residential areas, including schools and camps for displaced people, and that their fighters were present in such locations (pp. 20, 61, 125).
   • It states that by doing so, they violated their obligations to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks, and to avoid locating military targets in or around densely populated areas to the extent feasible (pp. 20, 61).
   • The report mentions that the Israeli military justified attacks on mosques and universities on the grounds that they had been employed for military purposes by Hamas or contained military infrastructure (pp. 33, 221-222).
2. Amnesty International’s Position on Justification:
   • Crucially, the report states that such conduct by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups does not release Israel from its own obligations under international humanitarian law (pp. 20, 61, 78).
   • Specifically, Israel remains obligated to:
     • Distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives (pp. 75-76).
     • Not direct attacks against civilians or civilian objects (pp. 75-76).
     • Avoid attacks that would be indiscriminate or disproportionate (i.e., where the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated) (pp. 20, 76).
     • Take all feasible precautions in attack to avoid or minimize civilian casualties (p. 77).
   • The report argues that even where Hamas fighters were located near or within densely populated areas, Israel was obligated to take all feasible precautions to spare civilians and avoid attacks that would be indiscriminate or disproportionate (p. 34).
   • Regarding human shields, the report clarifies that while international humanitarian law prohibits using human shields (p. 78), Protocol I (Article 51(8)) also states that a violation by one side (e.g., using human shields) “…shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians” (p. 78).
   • Amnesty International’s investigations into 15 specific air strikes concluded that in those instances, the locations struck were civilian objects, and they did not find evidence that the strikes were directed at a military objective or that the destruction was justified by imperative military necessity (pp. 19, 106-111).
   • The report also states that Amnesty International has not found evidence that the possible diversion of aid by Hamas explained the actions Israel took in blocking, restricting, and impeding the entry and delivery of aid and other items necessary for life into and within Gaza (p. 34).
3. Destruction After Israeli Control, Questioning Military Necessity:
   • The report details investigations into the destruction of several cultural and religious sites, including Al-Azhar University (Al-Mughraqa campus), Israa University, Al-Dhilal mosque, and Al-Istiqlal mosque (pp. 33, 222-232).
   • A key finding for these sites, particularly the universities and some mosques destroyed by controlled demolitions, is that Israeli forces were often already in control of the sites at the time of their destruction (pp. 33, 222, 224, 227-228).
   • Amnesty International argues that this control “suggest[s] that there was no imperative military necessity for their destruction” at that moment (pp. 33, 222). If the sites were secured and no active hostilities were ongoing from them, the immediate military imperative to destroy them (especially by methods like controlled demolition which require time and planning) is questionable.
   • For example, Israa University was reportedly taken over by the Israeli army and used as a base for 70 days before its main buildings were demolished by explosives (p. 227).
   • Similarly, for the Al-Mughraqa campus of Al-Azhar University, Israeli forces had established a military road nearby and were active on the campus for weeks before the controlled demolition of two buildings (pp. 223-224). The army only appeared to start excavating for alleged tunnels near the destroyed buildings approximately two months after the demolition (p. 226).
   • Amnesty International states it was often “unable to find any official statement by the Israeli authorities that would explain the reasons for the destruction” of specific sites like the Al-Mughraqa campus of Al-Azhar University (p. 226) or Al-Istiqlal mosque (p. 232) at the time of those demolitions.
   • While Israel generally claimed Hamas used mosques and universities for military purposes (pp. 33, 221-222), the report finds that for the specific instances of controlled demolitions it investigated, the evidence of an ongoing, imperative military necessity at the moment of destruction was lacking or contradicted by the circumstances of Israeli control.
   • The report suggests that “this destruction of Palestinian cultural and religious sites appears to have been considered the very purpose and goal of Israeli soldiers’ actions” in some instances, rather than a response to an immediate military threat (pp. 33, 222).
4. Challenges to Independent Verification of “Human Shield” Claims, with Israel as a Primary Source:
   • The Amnesty International report notes that Israel frequently justified its attacks on civilian infrastructure, including mosques and universities, by alleging that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups were using these sites for military purposes, such as storing weapons, concealing tunnels, or launching attacks (pp. 33, 221-222).
   • However, the report highlights that Amnesty International itself was consistently denied access to Gaza by Israeli authorities (p. 43), a restriction that also applies to other independent human rights investigators and international bodies. This denial of access severely impedes the ability of independent entities to conduct on-the-ground investigations and verify claims made by any party, including Israel’s allegations regarding the use of human shields or the military use of civilian sites.
   • In the specific cases of destruction of cultural and religious sites investigated by Amnesty International, such as the Al-Mughraqa campus of Al-Azhar University and Al-Istiqlal mosque, the report states it was “unable to find any official statement by the Israeli authorities that would explain the reasons for the destruction” at the time of those demolitions (pp. 226, 232). This suggests a lack of contemporaneous, detailed justification from Israel for specific actions, beyond general claims.
   • Furthermore, in its investigation of 15 specific air strikes that caused significant civilian casualties, Amnesty International “did not find any evidence that any of the strikes were directed at a military objective” or that the destruction was justified by imperative military necessity (pp. 19, 111). This indicates that in numerous instances investigated by Amnesty, Israel’s actions were not substantiated by evidence of legitimate military targets, which would include sites actively used for human shielding in a way that makes them targetable under IHL (while still adhering to proportionality and precaution).
   • While the report does not explicitly state that Israel is the only source for all claims of human shielding, the severe restrictions on independent access to Gaza, coupled with Amnesty’s findings where Israeli justifications were not evident or substantiated by their own research, underscore the significant difficulty in independently verifying such claims. This often leaves Israeli military narratives as a dominant, if not sole, source of information for specific operational justifications, which human rights organizations then attempt to scrutinize through remote methods and available evidence.
   • Independent journalism from previous conflicts have shown little evidence for Israel’s claims of Hamas’ use of human shields:
     • https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2014/07/jeremy-bowens-gaza-notebook-i-saw-no-evidence-hamas-using-palestinians-human
     • https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/israel-gaza-conflict-myth-of-hamass-human-shield-gazans-deny-being-put-in-line-of-fire/30448511.html

So, while the Amnesty International report acknowledges that Hamas’s actions (like operating in civilian areas) endangered civilians and violated international law, it firmly states that these actions do not legally justify Israel’s own violations of international humanitarian law, nor do they absolve Israel of its obligations to protect civilians and adhere to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in its attacks. The report’s conclusion of genocidal acts by Israel is based on Israel’s own pattern of conduct, its policies, and the intent inferred from them, irrespective of Hamas’s unlawful actions.i

1. This is an appeal to authority. No. My argment is not based off the fact that a human rights organization said so - it is based off the points and methodology said human rights organization used.

2. Why should I trust you? I’m not the one making the points. I’m merely summarizing Amnesty International’s document, whose methodology can be found on this website

3. You’re antisemetic! First of all, I do not hate the Jews. Second of all, even if this was true, this point is ad hominem.

4. How do we know Amnesty International is true? See the methodology of the report on my website.

This chapter presents Amnesty International’s overall conclusion based on the report’s findings and provides a comprehensive set of recommendations to various actors.

8.1 CONCLUSION (p. 283)

• Finding of Genocide: Through its research and legal analysis, Amnesty International (AI) has found sufficient basis to conclude that Israel committed, during the nine-month period under review (7 October 2023 - early July 2024), prohibited acts under Articles II (a), (b), and (c) of the Genocide Convention. These acts are:
  • Killing Palestinians in Gaza.
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm to Palestinians in Gaza.
  • Deliberately inflicting on Palestinians in Gaza conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part.
• Specific Intent: AI also found sufficient basis to conclude that these acts were committed with the specific intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, as such, who form a substantial part of the Palestinian population (a protected group under the Convention).
• Overall Conclusion: Therefore, AI concludes that Israel, through its policies, actions, and omissions against Palestinians in Gaza following 7 October 2023, committed and is committing genocide.
• Ongoing Violations & Need for Further Investigation: AI notes it is unaware of evidence suggesting Israel’s policies have significantly changed since the research period. The commission of genocide engages Israel’s responsibility under the Genocide Convention. Further investigations and determinations by judicial and non-judicial bodies (ICJ, UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry) are warranted.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS (pp. 283-294)

AI makes a range of recommendations to urgently end the commission of prohibited acts, prevent future acts, and ensure justice, accountability, and full reparation.

• 8.2.1 Israeli Authorities (pp. 284-288):
  • Acts of Genocide:
    • Immediately stop committing prohibited genocidal acts.
    • Prevent further commission of such acts by any state organ.
    • Suspend, investigate, and prosecute officials suspected of responsibility for genocide or related crimes.
    • Cooperate fully with ICJ proceedings, including complying with all provisional measures.
    • Engage fully with international investigations into genocide.
  • Humanitarian Situation:
    • Agree to and uphold an immediate, sustained ceasefire.
    • Protect and facilitate humanitarian access and delivery of aid.
    • Allow unhindered passage of all essential supplies (food, water, medicine, fuel, electricity).
    • Urgently improve the humanitarian situation and reverse policies that led to its deterioration.
    • Ensure basic needs (water, food, housing, essentials, electricity, fuel) are met.
    • Allow forcibly displaced Palestinians to return to their areas of residence and enable urgent reconstruction.
    • Allow free passage of civilians within Gaza.
    • Ensure aid workers can safely access damaged infrastructure for repairs.
    • End punitive cuts to essential services.
    • Allow patients needing urgent treatment to access healthcare outside Gaza and return.
  • Conduct of Hostilities:
    • End and refrain from all conduct amounting to crimes under international law.
    • Respect and implement all IHL rules.
    • Suspend personnel suspected of serious IHL violations pending investigations.
    • Conduct prompt, impartial, independent, and effective investigations into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
    • Ensure legal frameworks enable effective investigation and prosecution of international crimes, with no statute of limitations or immunity.
    • Provide full and effective reparations to victims.
  • Apartheid, Occupation, Blockade:
    • End the system of apartheid against Palestinians.
    • End the unlawful occupation of the OPT (West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza) in line with the ICJ advisory opinion of July 2024.
    • Lift the unlawful blockade of Gaza and remove all associated arbitrary restrictions.
    • End arbitrary movement restrictions.
    • Allow Palestinians access to natural resources in Gaza.
    • Ensure Palestinians in Gaza have access to their social and economic rights.
    • Recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return and receive restitution/compensation.
• 8.2.2 Hamas and Other Palestinian Armed Groups (pp. 288-289):
  • Immediately and unconditionally release civilian hostages.
  • Ensure all captives are treated humanely and visited by the ICRC.
  • Respect and implement all applicable IHL rules, particularly those protecting civilians, and avoid locating military targets in or around densely populated areas.
  • Agree to and uphold an immediate, sustained ceasefire.
  • Protect and facilitate humanitarian access.
• 8.2.3 Authorities of State of Palestine (p. 289):
  • Expedite impartial, independent, and effective investigations into alleged crimes under international law by Palestinian armed groups, bringing suspects to trial in proceedings meeting international standards (without recourse to the death penalty).
  • Ensure domestic legal frameworks enable such investigation and prosecution, with no statutes of limitations or immunity.
• 8.2.4 Third States (pp. 289-291): (Especially those with influence over Israel like USA, UK, Germany, EU members)
  • Take urgent steps to end Israeli actions in Gaza amounting to genocide, ensuring Israel implements ICJ provisional measures.
  • Do not render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful occupation and apartheid system.
  • Oppose any attempts by Israel to establish a permanent military presence in Gaza, alter its borders, or shrink its territory. Egypt should work towards reopening Rafah crossing.
  • Immediately suspend all direct/indirect arms transfers to Israel.
  • Adopt policies to ensure private entities cease providing military services/supplies used by Israel in Gaza.
  • Urgently act to ensure justice and accountability for alleged international crimes in Gaza (e.g., through universal jurisdiction, supporting ICC investigations, pressuring Israel to allow access for investigative bodies).
  • Cooperate with other states and international justice mechanisms.
  • Ensure domestic legal frameworks enable investigation and prosecution of international crimes.
  • Pressure Israel to allow entry to international investigative mechanisms.
  • Use all diplomatic and economic tools to ensure Israel implements the report’s recommendations. (For states with influence over Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups):
  • Immediately suspend arms transfers to these groups.
  • Urgently act to ensure justice and accountability for their alleged international crimes.
• 8.2.5 Office of Prosecutor of ICC (p. 292):
  • Urgently consider the commission of genocide by Israeli officials in the ongoing investigation.
  • Expedite investigations and apply for arrest warrants where appropriate, including for genocide.
  • Promptly investigate and prosecute apartheid as a crime against humanity.
  • Where offences against the administration of justice occur, consider charges.
  • Request adequate resources from the Assembly of States Parties.
  • Publicly support Palestinian NGOs and condemn attacks on them.
  • Ensure protection for victims and witnesses.
  • Undertake effective outreach to affected communities.
  • Consider cooperating with national authorities under complementarity principles.
• 8.2.6 UN Bodies (pp. 293-294):
  • Security Council:
    • Adopt a resolution for an immediate and enduring ceasefire with compliance measures.
    • Impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Israel, Hamas, and other Palestinian armed groups.
    • Impose targeted sanctions on Israeli and Hamas officials most implicated in international crimes.
    • Take steps to advance Israel’s withdrawal from the OPT.
  • General Assembly:
    • Maintain engagement and meet again if Israel fails to comply with the GA resolution on the ICJ advisory opinion.
    • Ensure full funding for UN entities and mandates covering these issues.
    • Adopt a resolution to re-establish the Special Committee against Apartheid.
  • Human Rights Council:
    • Provide the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the OPT and Israel with significant additional resources.
    • Fully support the UN database of business activities in Israeli settlements and call for its expansion.

In essence, Chapter 8 concludes that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza and provides a comprehensive roadmap of actions for Israel, Palestinian entities, third states, and international bodies to stop the genocide, ensure accountability, alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe, and address the root causes of the conflict, including the occupation and apartheid.

This chapter lays out the legal definition and elements of the crime of genocide as the framework for the report’s analysis of Israel’s actions in Gaza.

5.1 PROHIBITION (pp. 85-87)

• Definition and Origin (p. 85): The term “genocide” was coined by Raphael Lemkin to describe the destruction of a nation or ethnic group. The UN General Assembly affirmed it as a crime under international law in 1946. The 1948 Genocide Convention was the first treaty to explicitly define and criminalize genocide.
• Core Principles (p. 85): Genocide is a crime under international law whether committed in peace or armed conflict. The Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute (establishing the ICC) are the principal treaties. The principles of the Genocide Convention, including its definition, are recognized as customary international law. The prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm (jus cogens), meaning no derogation is permitted.
• Responsibility (pp. 86-87): Genocide entails both individual criminal responsibility (for those who commit, conspire, incite, attempt, or are complicit) and state responsibility (when a state organ or attributable person/group commits genocide). States have a duty to prevent and punish genocide. The Rome Statute includes genocide as a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Palestine is a party to the Rome Statute, accepting ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes in the OPT since 2014.

5.2 DEFINITION (p. 88)

The report quotes Article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as: “…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

The key distinguishing feature of genocide is the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part, “as such.” This must be present in addition to the general intent required for each individual underlying act.

5.3 GENOCIDAL ACTS (pp. 89-92)

This section details the actus reus (criminal conduct) elements of genocide, focusing on the three acts most relevant to the report’s analysis of Israel’s actions:

• (a) Killing members of the group (p. 89): This refers to deliberate or intentional killing. In armed conflict, it can include causing civilian deaths through direct attacks or indiscriminate attacks deliberately directed at the civilian population alongside military objectives. The ICJ has found that an indiscriminate attack not confined to military objectives and also directed at a civilian population constitutes “killings.”
• (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (pp. 89-90): The harm must be serious enough to threaten or contribute to the group’s physical or biological destruction. It doesn’t need to be permanent but must cause “grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.” Examples include torture, inhumane treatment, sexual violence, and deportation combined with beatings or threats of death. A lower threshold for “serious bodily or mental harm” has been argued for children.
• (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (pp. 91-92): This refers to methods of destruction that are not immediate killing but lead to physical or biological destruction over time. Examples include: subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, reducing essential medical services, systematically expelling them from homes, and creating conditions leading to a “slow death” (e.g., lack of food, water, shelter, sanitation, or excessive physical exertion). Proof of actual destruction is not required, but the “objective probability” of these conditions leading to destruction can be considered. Factors include the actual nature of the conditions, the duration, and the group’s characteristics (e.g., vulnerability of children). Forced displacement, if carried out in circumstances calculated to bring about physical destruction, can fall under this act.

5.4 PALESTINIANS AS A PROTECTED GROUP (pp. 93-96)

• Protected Groups (p. 93): The Genocide Convention protects “national, ethnical, racial or religious” groups. This list is exhaustive. The definition is based on both objective and subjective criteria, considered case-by-case in its particular context.
• Palestinians as a Group (pp. 93, 95): The report argues that Palestinians constitute a distinct “national, ethnical, and racial group” under the Convention. They share a common language, similar customs, cultural practices, and deep political, ethnic, social, and cultural ties, regardless of their specific location (Gaza, West Bank, Israel) or legal status (citizen, refugee). The ICJ made a preliminary finding that Palestinians “appear to constitute a distinct ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group’” (p. 95).
• “In Part” (pp. 95-96): The intent to destroy a group “in part” is sufficient. International jurisprudence requires the targeted part to be “substantial” – significant enough to impact the group as a whole. A specific numeric threshold isn’t required. Palestinians in Gaza are considered a “substantial part” of the whole Palestinian group (approximately 40% of Palestinians in the OPT in 2023).

5.5 SPECIFIC INTENT (pp. 97-105)

This is the mens rea (mental element) of genocide.

• 5.5.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility (pp. 98-100): Specific intent requires more than general awareness of consequences; the perpetrator must consciously desire or seek the destruction of the targeted group. This intent is volitional/goal-based. The “destruction” refers to physical or biological destruction, not cultural. Actual destruction is not a prerequisite; the intent is key. The perpetrator doesn’t need to select the most efficient method.
  • Inferring Specific Intent (pp. 99-100): Direct evidence of genocidal intent is rare. Intent can be inferred from facts and circumstances, including: the general context, systematic targeting, scale of atrocities, number of victims, targeting without distinction of age/gender, concealment of evidence, repetition of destructive acts, use of derogatory language, and a general political doctrine. Destruction of cultural/religious property can also be evidence of intent to physically destroy the group.
• 5.5.2 State Intent (pp. 101-103): Jurisprudence is more limited. The ICJ accepts that state intent can be inferred. However, its rulings on inferring intent (e.g., the “only reasonable inference” test) can be read narrowly.
  • ICJ’s Threshold (p. 102): The ICJ has stated that for a pattern of conduct to evidence genocidal intent, it must be such that it “could only point to the existence of such intent.” This standard has been criticized as too high.
  • State Intent in Armed Conflict (p. 103): Amnesty International argues that the ICJ’s “only reasonable inference” test should be applied to drawing intent from a pattern of conduct only and not when other methods of inference (e.g., scope/severity of conduct) are present. Genocidal intent can coexist with other motives, especially in armed conflict where military objectives are pursued. Genocide can be a means to achieve military objectives.
• 5.5.3 Approaching Israel’s Intent in Gaza (pp. 104-105): Amnesty International’s approach to assessing Israel’s intent will be:
  • Holistic: Evidence must be approached and considered holistically, based on direct, contextual, and circumstantial evidence, alongside a pattern of conduct.
  • Contextual: The unlawful military occupation, the apartheid system, and the immediate circumstances post-7 October 2023 are crucial context. Hamas’s control and Gaza’s high population density are also relevant.
  • Coexistence with Military Goals: Genocidal intent can coexist with military goals. If military goals automatically preclude genocide, the prohibition would be meaningless in armed conflict.
  • Motive vs. Intent: Various motives (political, personal hatred) do not negate genocidal intent if the intent to destroy the group is clear.
  • Broader Picture: Individual violations, viewed in isolation, might be war crimes or IHRL violations. However, approached holistically and cumulatively, considering the entire offensive and repeated warnings, a “different and much more disturbing picture emerges” which must be analyzed for a determination on genocide.

In summary, this chapter defines genocide, focusing on the prohibited acts (killing, serious harm, inflicting destructive conditions of life) and the specific intent to destroy a protected group (Palestinians in Gaza) “as such,” in whole or in part. It explains how this intent can be inferred, especially in the context of state responsibility and armed conflict, setting the stage for the report’s subsequent analysis of Israel’s actions and intent.

This chapter outlines the legal framework governing Israel’s conduct in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), including Gaza, particularly in the context of the armed conflict that began on 7 October 2023.

• Overview (p. 70): The situation in Gaza and the West Bank is considered a military occupation under international law. Israel has obligations under both international humanitarian law (IHL) – including the law of occupation – and applicable international human rights law (IHRL). IHL binds all parties to an armed conflict, including non-state armed groups. IHRL applies in peacetime and during armed conflict, and is legally binding on states and their agents.

4.1 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (pp. 70-79)

IHL (law of armed conflict/laws of war) aims to limit human suffering in armed conflict by balancing military necessity with humanity. It primarily protects those not participating in hostilities (civilians) and combatants who are sick, wounded, or captured. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols are key instruments. While Israel is party to the Geneva Conventions, it is not to the Additional Protocols, but is bound by customary IHL rules (p. 71).

• 4.1.1 Nature of Armed Conflict (p. 71): Military occupations are considered international armed conflicts. The occupation of Gaza is governed by IHL applicable to belligerent occupation (occupation law) and IHRL. In situations of intense fighting, like in Gaza post-7 October 2023, IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities apply alongside occupation law and IHRL. The fighting between Israel and Hamas (and other armed groups) is also subject to rules of non-international armed conflict.
• 4.1.2 Law of Belligerent Occupation (pp. 72-75):
  • Definition & Effective Control (p. 72): Occupation occurs when territory is “actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” The key is “effective control.” Despite its 2005 “disengagement,” Israel retained effective control over Gaza (borders, airspace, territorial waters, population registry, utilities), meaning it remained the occupying power, a stance reaffirmed by the ICJ. Its control increased further during the post-7 October 2023 offensive.
  • Obligations (pp. 73-75): The occupying power (Israel) is responsible for the welfare of the “protected persons” (Palestinians in Gaza). This includes:
    • Ensuring public order and safety, respecting existing laws unless absolutely prevented (p. 73).
    • Prohibiting destruction of property unless “rendered absolutely necessary by military operations” (p. 73). This includes a ban on wanton destruction, which is a grave breach.
    • Prohibiting deportation or forcible transfer of the civilian population unless for their security or imperative military reasons. If displaced, they must be received in satisfactory conditions (shelter, hygiene, health, safety, nutrition) (p. 74).
    • Ensuring food and medical supplies for the population, bringing them in if local resources are inadequate. This extends to clothing, bedding, shelter, and other essentials (p. 74). The obligation to agree to and facilitate humanitarian relief schemes is unconditional (p. 75).
    • Prohibiting collective punishment of protected persons (p. 75).
• 4.1.3 Rules on Conduct of Hostilities (pp. 75-79):
  • Principle of Distinction (pp. 75-76): Parties must always distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military objectives. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives; if there’s doubt, an object is presumed civilian.
  • Prohibition of Indiscriminate and Disproportionate Attacks (p. 76): Indiscriminate attacks (those not directed at a specific military objective or using means that cannot be so directed) are prohibited. Disproportionate attacks (those expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated) are also prohibited. Launching such attacks intentionally can be a war crime.
  • Precautions in Attack (p. 77): Constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid/minimize incidental harm, verify targets, and halt attacks if they become wrongly directed or disproportionate. Effective advance warning must be given unless circumstances do not permit. Means and methods of attack must be chosen to minimize civilian risk.
  • Precautions Against Effects of Attacks (p. 77): Parties must, to the maximum extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives near densely populated areas and remove civilians/objects from the vicinity of military objectives.
  • Specially Protected Persons and Objects (pp. 77-78): Medical personnel, hospitals, and medical transports are specially protected and must not be attacked, unless hospitals are used outside their humanitarian function to commit “acts harmful to the enemy” (after a warning and reasonable time limit). Humanitarian relief personnel and objects must also be respected and protected. Buildings for religion, education, art, science, charitable purposes, and historic monuments require special care and must not be military objectives.
  • Human Shields (p. 78): Using human shields is prohibited. However, if one side uses human shields, this does not release the other side from its IHL obligations towards civilians.
  • Survival of Civilian Population and Humanitarian Access (p. 79): Parties must refrain from depriving civilians of means of survival and must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of impartial humanitarian relief for civilians in need. Consent to relief schemes cannot be arbitrarily refused. Humanitarian personnel and objects must be respected and protected. Intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian personnel/missions or using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare are war crimes.
  • Investigation (p. 80): States must investigate alleged war crimes and, if appropriate, prosecute suspects. This duty extends to all grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (pp. 80-84)

IHRL remains applicable during armed conflict and occupation, complementing IHL. Israel is bound by IHRL treaties it has ratified (ICESCR, ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, CRPD) and customary IHRL (p. 80-81).

• Key Rights (pp. 81-84):
  • Right to Life (pp. 81-82): A foundational, non-derogable right. States must prevent arbitrary deprivation of life and ensure accountability. Deprivation of life is only justifiable if required to save life. Acts prohibiting or impeding humanitarian services violate this right.
  • Right to Food (p. 83): Everyone must have physical and economic access to adequate food. States have a core obligation to alleviate hunger, including through international cooperation.
  • Right to Housing and Prohibition of Forced Evictions (p. 83): Widespread destruction of homes can constitute forced evictions, a breach of the right to housing (ICESCR Art. 11).
  • Right to Health (pp. 83-84): States have core obligations, including ensuring non-discriminatory access to health facilities, minimum essential food, basic shelter, sanitation, safe water, and essential drugs. Limiting access to health services as a punitive measure violates this right.
  • Right to Remedy and Reparation (p. 84): Victims of human rights violations and crimes under international law have a right to an effective remedy, including justice, truth, and reparation (restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition). States responsible for IHL violations must make full reparations.

In essence, this chapter establishes that Israel, as the occupying power and a party to the armed conflict, has extensive and overlapping obligations under both IHL and IHRL to protect the Palestinian population in Gaza, ensure their basic needs are met, conduct hostilities lawfully, and provide accountability for violations.

This chapter assesses whether Israel committed the prohibited acts detailed in Chapter 6 with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, as such, in whole or in part – the crucial mental element required for the crime of genocide.

• Context of Intent (pp. 202-204):
  • Historical Context: Israel’s offensive occurred within the context of a brutal 57-year-old unlawful military occupation, an apartheid system subjecting Palestinians to oppression, and a 17-year-old unlawful blockade of Gaza. These pre-existing conditions demonstrate an animus towards Palestinians (p. 202).
  • Immediate Context: The offensive followed the horrific 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas, which Israeli officials used to frame the conflict as a fight between “good and evil” and to dehumanize Palestinians (p. 202). The political context in Israel, including Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reliance on ultra-nationalist, anti-Palestinian parties, is also relevant (p. 203).
  • Methodology for Assessing Intent: Amnesty International (AI) considered a range of evidence holistically: the overall pattern of Israel’s conduct, the scale of killings and destruction, dehumanizing rhetoric by Israeli officials, statements calling for destruction, and the destruction of cultural/religious sites. AI examined an alternative hypothesis (that Israel acted unlawfully but without genocidal intent) and rejected it (p. 204). Crucially, military goals can coexist with genocidal intent, or genocide can be the means to achieve military goals (p. 204).

7.1 PATTERN OF CONDUCT (pp. 205-234)

This section argues that the pattern of Israel’s actions points to genocidal intent.

• 7.1.1 Deadly and Destructive Attacks (pp. 205-212): The sheer scale of unlawful attacks, the number of civilian victims (including entire families), the repetition of such acts, and the systematic nature of destruction (e.g., 10,000 air strikes in under two months, widespread use of 2,000-lb bombs in densely populated areas) indicate an intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza (pp. 205-207). The widespread harm, including extrajudicial executions and the unprecedented death toll among children and humanitarian workers, supports this (pp. 207-209). The massive destruction of infrastructure (63% of total structures by July 2024, average of one damaged/destroyed building every 17 meters) also points to this intent (pp. 210-212).
• 7.1.2 Inflicting Conditions of Life Calculated to Bring About Destruction of Palestinians (pp. 212-216): Israel deliberately subjected Palestinians in Gaza to conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction. This was the combined result of:
  • Destruction of critical infrastructure (healthcare, food production, water, sanitation).
  • Mass forced displacement into unsafe and unsanitary conditions.
  • Denial and obstruction of essential services and life-saving supplies. Israel knew these actions would lead to hunger, disease, and death, and these consequences were intended. The fact that Israel maintained these policies despite ICJ orders and international warnings underscores this intent (pp. 213-215). Episodic mitigation efforts do not negate this underlying intent as they were insufficient and did not fundamentally alter the dire conditions (p. 216).
• 7.1.3 Destruction of Cultural and Religious Sites (pp. 216-232): While not a prohibited act itself, destruction of cultural and religious property can be evidence of genocidal intent. There was extensive and unprecedented destruction of such sites in Gaza (mosques, cemeteries, universities, archives) (pp. 216-217). AI investigated four specific cases (Al-Azhar University’s Al-Mughraqa campus, Israa University’s Al-Zahra campus, Al-Dhilal mosque and Bani Suheila cemetery, Al-Istiqlal mosque) where Israeli forces destroyed these sites through controlled demolitions after gaining military control, suggesting no imperative military necessity and that destruction was the purpose (pp. 217, 222-232). Videos showed soldiers celebrating these demolitions (pp. 220, 225-226).
• 7.1.4 Incommunicado Detention, Torture and Other Ill-Treatment (pp. 233-235): The pattern of incommunicado detention, widespread torture, and other ill-treatment (including sexual violence) of Palestinians from Gaza underscores systematic dehumanization and mental/physical abuse, contributing to an inference of genocidal intent when viewed with other actions (p. 233). Israel used the Unlawful Combatants Law to institutionalize enforced disappearance and deny due process (p. 234).

7.2 DEHUMANIZATION OF PALESTINIANS (pp. 235-241)

Dehumanization often accompanies genocide.

• 7.2.1 Pre-existing Discourse (pp. 236-238): Deeply rooted dehumanizing, derogatory, and racist language towards Palestinians by Israeli officials and public figures was normalized before 7 October 2023, contributing to an environment of impunity and hatred (p. 236). Examples include statements from 2014 and 2015 by then-Knesset member Ayelet Shaked and Prime Minister Netanyahu, and later statements by ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich (pp. 237-238).
• 7.2.2 Escalating Use of Dehumanizing Language (pp. 239-241): After 7 October 2023, this rhetoric escalated significantly. Then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant referred to Palestinians as “human animals” (p. 239). Major General Ghassan Alian called Gazans “human beasts” (p. 239). Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly framed the conflict as between “children of light” and “children of darkness” or between civilization and barbarism (pp. 239-240). The deputy mayor of Jerusalem called Palestinian detainees “Nazi rapists” and “subhuman” (p. 241).

7.3 STATEMENTS ON DESTRUCTION OF PALESTINIANS (pp. 241-278)

This section analyzes explicit and implicit calls for the destruction of Palestinians by senior Israeli officials, which appear to have influenced soldiers on the ground.

• 7.3.1 Calls for No Humanitarian Aid Until Hostages Are Released (pp. 244-251): Officials, including Minister Israel Katz and Minister Ben-Gvir, repeatedly stated that no aid (food, water, fuel, electricity) would be allowed into Gaza until hostages were released, explicitly linking the survival of the civilian population to Hamas’s actions and demonstrating an intent to create destructive conditions (pp. 244, 247-248). Prime Minister Netanyahu also initially took this stance (p. 248). Even when minimal aid was allowed under US pressure, the rhetoric often framed it as a reluctant concession that could be reversed (pp. 249-250).
• 7.3.2 Statements That There Are No ‘Uninvolved Civilians’ (pp. 252-256): Statements by officials like President Isaac Herzog (“It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible”) and Minister Ben-Gvir (equating those who distribute sweets with terrorists to be eliminated) implied all Palestinians in Gaza were legitimate targets (pp. 252-253, 255). These sentiments were echoed by soldiers on the ground (pp. 255-256).
• 7.3.3 Calls for Annihilation of Gaza (pp. 257-263): Prime Minister Netanyahu’s repeated references to the biblical story of Amalek (a nation ordered to be totally destroyed) in the context of the Gaza offensive, particularly in speeches to soldiers, are highlighted as significant indicators of intent, especially given the known interpretation of this story as a call for total annihilation (pp. 257-260). Minister Smotrich also used this reference to call for the destruction of cities in Gaza (p. 263).
• 7.3.4 Echoes of Calls for Total Destruction (pp. 264-267): AI documented numerous videos of Israeli soldiers in Gaza echoing these calls for total destruction, often specifically referencing Amalek, or stating “there are no uninvolved civilians” (pp. 261, 264-265). This shows the rhetoric permeated the ranks of the military.
• 7.3.5 Celebration of Destruction (pp. 268-272): Dozens of videos show Israeli soldiers celebrating or mocking the destruction of Palestinian property, including homes, mosques, and schools, often through controlled demolitions in areas under Israeli control. This indicates that destruction was often an end in itself, not a byproduct of military necessity (pp. 268-272).
• 7.3.6 Official Israeli Narrative and Other Explanations About Statements (pp. 273-274): Israel argued before the ICJ that such statements were “random quotes” or “rhetorical anguish.” AI notes that while some statements could be dismissed if isolated, the sheer number and the seniority of the officials involved, coupled with the pattern of conduct, make this defense unconvincing (p. 273).
• 7.3.7 Impunity for Calls for Destruction (pp. 275-278): For months, Israeli authorities failed to investigate or condemn these statements. Only after the ICJ’s first order did some (limited) action begin, such as a letter from the army’s chief of staff and the MAG, but these were insufficient and did not address the core issue of incitement by senior officials (pp. 277). No Knesset members were disciplined for such calls by the time of reporting (p. 275).

7.4 INTENT TO DESTROY PALESTINIANS (pp. 278-282)

• Conclusion on Intent: AI concludes that the pattern of conduct (unlawful attacks, infliction of destructive conditions, destruction of cultural sites, torture), combined with dehumanizing rhetoric and explicit/implicit calls for destruction by senior Israeli officials that were echoed by soldiers, and the context of apartheid and occupation, leads to the only reasonable inference that genocidal intent has been part and parcel of Israel’s conduct in Gaza since 7 October 2023 (p. 282).
• Military Objectives vs. Genocidal Intent: The existence of military objectives (e.g., eradicating Hamas) does not negate genocidal intent. Israel’s actions went far beyond what could be justified by military necessity (p. 280).
• Recklessness vs. Intent: Many of Israel’s unlawful acts (e.g., aid denial, torture) were, by definition, intentional and deliberate, not reckless (p. 280).
• Instrumental Intent: Even if the destruction of Palestinians was seen as instrumental to destroying Hamas, this is still genocidal intent (p. 281).
• Disregard for Palestinian Life: The profound disregard for Palestinian life, rooted in systemic dehumanization, is itself evidence of genocidal intent (p. 281).
• Multiple Motives: While various officials might have had different motives (security, revenge, political survival), this does not negate the clear genocidal intent that emerges from the evidence (p. 281).

In summary, Chapter 7 argues that a holistic examination of Israel’s actions, the devastating conditions created, the widespread destruction (including cultural sites), the pattern of torture, coupled with dehumanizing rhetoric and direct/indirect calls for destruction from senior officials (echoed by soldiers), and the overall context, lead to the conclusion that Israel acted with the specific intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as a group.

This chapter examines Israel’s policies and actions in Gaza between 7 October 2023 and early July 2024 to assess whether they amount to prohibited acts under the Genocide Convention, specifically: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

6.1 KILLING AND CAUSING SERIOUS HARM (pp. 106-122)

This section focuses on Israeli air strikes and their devastating impact.

• 6.1.1 Direct Attacks on Civilians or Indiscriminate Attacks (pp. 107-118): Amnesty International (AI) investigated 15 specific air strikes across Gaza (northern, central, and southern areas) that hit homes, residential buildings, a church, a market street, and a public market (p. 107).
  • Findings on 15 Strikes: These strikes killed at least 334 civilians, including at least 141 children, and wounded hundreds (p. 107). AI found no evidence of a military objective in any of these 15 cases (pp. 107, 110). All those killed were civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities (p. 111).
  • Pattern of Attacks: The strikes were often conducted at night when residents were likely sleeping, used large US-made bombs (e.g., JDAMs) in densely populated areas, and were often in areas south of Wadi Gaza where people had been ordered to “evacuate” (pp. 111, 107). This suggests an intent to cause a high number of civilian casualties (p. 111). No effective advance warnings were given in 14 of the 15 cases; in the one case where a warning was given, it was ineffective (p. 110).
  • Emblematic Cases Detailed (pp. 112-118):
    • Saint Porphyrius Church, Gaza City (19 Oct 2023): An air strike on a building in the church compound, where ~450 displaced Christians were sheltering, killed 18 civilians (p. 112).
    • Shehada and Nasman Families, Rafah (14 Dec 2023): An air strike on a three-storey house killed 31 civilians, including 11 children (many from a displaced family), and injured at least 10. The youngest victim was three months old (p. 114-115).
    • Abdelal Family, Rafah (20 Apr 2024): An air strike destroyed a house, killing 20 family members (16 children and four women) while they were asleep (p. 117).
• 6.1.2 Scale of Killings and Injuries (pp. 119-121):
  • Overall Casualties: By 7 October 2024, the Gaza Ministry of Health recorded 42,010 Palestinian fatalities, with children, women, and older people constituting just under 60% of fully identified fatalities (p. 119). An estimated 97,590 Palestinians were injured (p. 119).
  • High Impact of Explosive Weapons: The use of heavy explosive weapons in densely populated urban areas is a primary cause of civilian deaths and injuries (p. 120). The WHO reported vast numbers of life-changing injuries, including thousands of amputations and severe burns (p. 120).
• 6.1.3 Prohibited Acts (p. 122): AI concludes that the direct or indiscriminate attacks by Israel constitute the acts of “killing members of the group” and “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” under the Genocide Convention. These strikes caused deliberate and unlawful deaths and injuries to Palestinian civilians. The assessment of intent is detailed in Chapter 7.

6.2 INFLICTING CONDITIONS OF LIFE CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT DESTRUCTION OF PALESTINIANS (pp. 123-201)

This section assesses three patterns of Israeli actions that, cumulatively, inflicted devastating conditions of life on Palestinians in Gaza.

• 6.2.1 Damage to and Destruction of Objects Indispensable to Survival of Civilian Population (pp. 124-132):
  • Widespread Destruction: Critical infrastructure (food production, homes, water, sanitation, health, energy) suffered vast damage (p. 124). The level and speed of destruction were described as “unimaginable” and “unprecedented” by the UN (p. 124).
  • Agricultural Land (pp. 126-128): Significant portions of agricultural land were destroyed through razing, bombing, and shelling, particularly in the “buffer zone” expanded by Israel along the border fence (now ~16% of Gaza’s total area) (p. 126, 128).
  • Homes (pp. 128-129): About 62% of all homes in Gaza were damaged or destroyed by January 2024, affecting ~1.08 million people (p. 128).
  • Water, Sanitation, Health Infrastructure (pp. 129-132): Nearly 84% of health facilities and 57% of water infrastructure were damaged/destroyed by January 2024 (p. 129). Sewage systems collapsed, and health facilities were forced to close or limit services due to damage, raids, and “evacuation” orders (pp. 129-130).
• 6.2.2 Mass Forced Displacement in Inhumane Conditions (pp. 131-145):
  • Scale of Displacement: Israel’s repeated “evacuation” orders triggered the largest wave of Palestinian displacement since 1948, with ~90% of Gaza’s population (1.9 million) displaced at least once by July 2024, many multiple times (p. 132).
  • Nature of Orders: Orders were sweeping, often incomprehensible, misleading, and arbitrary, creating panic and forcing people to flee in precarious conditions (p. 133).
  • Inhumane Conditions in “Safe Zones”: Displaced people were squeezed into ever-shrinking, unsanitary, and unsafe areas (e.g., Al-Mawasi) lacking basic necessities (shelter, food, water, sanitation) (pp. 132, 137-138). Israel failed in its obligations as an occupying power to ensure their safety and well-being (p. 133).
  • Waves of Displacement (pp. 135-143):
    • First Wave (7-12 Oct 2023): Initial “evacuation” orders for specific areas (p. 135).
    • Second Wave (13 Oct - 30 Nov 2023): Mass “evacuation” order for all of northern Gaza, affecting ~1.1 million people (p. 136). This caused panic and a humanitarian catastrophe as people fled south (pp. 136-137).
    • Third Wave (1 Dec 2023 onwards): Israel introduced an interactive map dividing Gaza into >600 blocks for “evacuations,” which was confusing and often inaccessible (p. 140). This coincided with expanded ground operations in Khan Younis and later Rafah, leading to further mass displacement into increasingly dire conditions (pp. 140-143). By August 2024, over 84% of Gaza’s area had been subjected to “evacuation” orders (p. 143).
• 6.2.3 Denial and Obstruction of Essential Services and Life-Saving Supplies (pp. 146-187):
  • Total Siege (pp. 147-148): After 7 October 2023, Israel imposed a total siege, cutting off electricity, water, food, and fuel. For about two weeks, nothing entered Gaza (p. 148).
  • Continued Restrictions (pp. 148-177): Despite some easing due to international pressure, Israel maintained severe restrictions on aid:
    • Access Points: Limited entry points, refusing to open sufficient crossings, especially into northern Gaza (p. 149). The Rafah crossing became central, then was closed after Israel’s ground operation began there (p. 155). New crossings (Erez East/West, Gate 96) provided minimal relief and were not consistently open (pp. 151, 154).
    • Oppressive Procedures: Lengthy, arbitrary, and onerous inspection procedures for trucks, causing significant delays and rejections of essential items, including medical supplies (e.g., anaesthesia machines, oxygen cylinders) and agricultural necessities (e.g., fodder) (pp. 151, 163-165).
    • Misleading Claims on Aid Volume (Box, pp. 166-177): Israeli claims about the amount of aid entering Gaza were misleading. AI’s analysis of UNRWA and COGAT data showed that the number of trucks never came close to pre-war levels, let alone the vastly increased needs (pp. 166-169). Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claims of sufficient calories entering Gaza were based on selective data (p. 170). A significant portion of “food trucks” later in the conflict were commercial, not humanitarian aid, with food sold at inflated prices (p. 171, 173).
    • Restrictions on Access Within Gaza (pp. 177-180): Israel deliberately prevented aid from reaching northern Gaza by delaying/refusing convoy requests, harassing humanitarian workers at checkpoints, and limiting fuel for essential services (pp. 178-179).
    • Restrictions on Energy (Fuel & Electricity) (pp. 180-187): Israel cut off electricity supply and tightly controlled fuel imports, which were far below pre-war levels and insufficient for essential services (hospitals, water, sanitation) (pp. 181-183). This was done despite knowing Gaza’s reliance on fuel and electricity from Israel (p. 181).
• 6.2.4 Resulting Conditions of Life (pp. 187-198):
  • Hunger (pp. 187-190): Widespread and severe hunger. By December 2023, >90% of the population faced crisis, emergency, or catastrophic hunger levels (IPC) (p. 188). People in northern Gaza resorted to eating animal fodder and wild plants (p. 188). Famine was declared “imminent” by March 2024, and the risk persisted (p. 190).
  • Disease (Box, pp. 190-195): Diseases spread at alarming rates due to malnutrition, overcrowding, and lack of sanitation. Sharp rises in acute respiratory illness, diarrhoea, scabies, and jaundice (p. 191). NICU mortality rates surged (p. 191). New disease threats like poliovirus in sewage emerged (p. 192). Overcrowding and breakdown of sanitation in displacement settings created a “perfect storm” for disease (pp. 193-194).
  • Impact on Children and Pregnant/Breastfeeding Women (pp. 195-198): These groups faced particular risks. Soaring rates of child malnutrition (15% of children under two wasting in northern Gaza by Jan 2024) (p. 189). Women were unable to breastfeed. Dozens of children died from malnutrition-related complications (pp. 188, 198). Nutrition experts warned of a “diminished future” for surviving children (p. 198).
• 6.2.5 Prohibited Acts (pp. 199-201): AI concludes that Israel deliberately inflicted conditions of life on Palestinians in Gaza calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part. This was achieved through:
  • Large-scale destruction of critical infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival.
  • Mass forced displacement into unsafe and unsanitary conditions.
  • Blocking, impeding, and restricting essential services and life-saving supplies. Israel knew these actions would lead to hunger, malnutrition, and disease, and these consequences were the intended outcome. The “objective probability” standard for inferring intent was met.

In summary, Chapter 6 details a pattern of Israeli actions—including deadly attacks and the systematic creation of devastating living conditions through destruction, displacement, and siege—that AI concludes constitute the prohibited genocidal acts of killing, causing serious harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of Palestinians in Gaza.

This chapter establishes the historical and immediate context crucial for understanding the events post-7 October 2023 and the report’s allegations.

3.1 SITUATION IN GAZA PRIOR TO 7 OCTOBER 2023 (pp. 47-55)

This section details the dire conditions in Gaza before the current offensive.

• Demographics & Refugee Status (p. 47): In 2023, nearly 5.5 million Palestinians lived in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), with approximately 2.2 million in the Gaza Strip (p. 47). A significant majority, around 70% of Gaza’s population, were Palestine refugees displaced during the 1948 Nakba, continuously denied their right of return by Israel (p. 47).
• 3.1.1 Dispossession, Prolonged Occupation and Apartheid (pp. 47-49): The report traces the historical dispossession of Palestinians, noting that the Gaza Strip became home to a vastly increased refugee population after 1948 (pp. 47-48). Israel’s military occupation of the OPT since 1967 is described as one of the “longest, and one of the most brutal, military occupations in modern times” (p. 48). Even after the 2005 “disengagement” where Israeli troops and settlers were withdrawn from Gaza, Israel retained significant control over Gaza (airspace, territorial waters, population registry, movement of people and goods), meaning Gaza remained occupied under international law (p. 49). Israel’s policies and practices are framed as part of a system of apartheid against Palestinians, aimed at maintaining Jewish demographic hegemony and control over land and resources, fragmenting the Palestinian people (p. 49).
• 3.1.2 Blockade (pp. 50-52): Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Israel declared Gaza a “hostile entity” and imposed an air, land, and sea blockade (p. 50). This blockade, tightening existing restrictions, severely limited the movement of people and goods, including “dual-use” items essential for civilian life, construction, and infrastructure (p. 51). The blockade devastated Gaza’s economy, healthcare, and essential services, leading to a chronic humanitarian crisis where 80% of the population depended on international aid before October 2023 (p. 52). Amnesty International and others have concluded this blockade amounts to collective punishment and is a key tool in maintaining Israel’s apartheid system (p. 52).
• 3.1.3 Impunity for War Crimes and Violations (pp. 53-55): The report highlights a pattern of impunity for war crimes and other violations of international law committed during previous Israeli military offensives on Gaza (2008-2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and smaller escalations in 2022, 2023), where thousands of Palestinian civilians were killed (p. 53). Despite UN-mandated commissions of inquiry, Israeli authorities consistently failed to conduct genuine, effective investigations into these violations (p. 54). The Israeli military’s internal Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism is described as a “tool to whitewash abuses” (p. 54). Impunity also persisted for serious violations by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, including indiscriminate rocket fire and summary executions (p. 55).

3.2 EVENTS SINCE 7 OCTOBER 2023 (pp. 56-69)

This section outlines the key events that triggered and characterized the current conflict.

• 3.2.1 Hamas-led Attacks on 7 October 2023 (p. 56): Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups breached the Gaza border fence, attacking civilian and military targets in southern Israel. They carried out deliberate mass killings, summary killings, abuses, property destruction, and took scores of hostages, including civilians and soldiers (p. 56). Approximately 1,200 people were killed, over 800 of them civilians (including at least 36 children), making it the deadliest attack in Israel’s history (p. 56). Some of these actions constituted war crimes (p. 56).
• 3.2.2 Israel’s Offensive on Gaza (pp. 57-60): Israel launched a military offensive (“Swords of Iron”) of unprecedented intensity and duration (p. 57). A “total siege” was announced on 9 October (p. 58). By 13 October, Israel issued a mass “evacuation” order for 1.1 million people in northern Gaza to move south, leading to mass displacement and a humanitarian crisis (p. 59). The Israeli military established the “Netzarim Corridor,” effectively cutting Gaza in two (p. 59). The offensive resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths and widespread destruction by early 2024 (figures for later periods cited elsewhere in the report) (p. 60).
• 3.2.3 Rocket and Mortar Fire by Palestinian Armed Groups (pp. 60-61): Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups continued to fire unguided rockets and mortars towards populated areas in Israel and from within Gaza, which are inherently indiscriminate (p. 60). These attacks caused civilian casualties in Israel and contributed to the displacement of Israelis (p. 60). Hamas acknowledged the difficulty of minimizing harm to civilians in Gaza due to Israeli attacks but claimed a governmental body independent of Hamas took some protective measures (p. 61).
• 3.2.4 International Response (pp. 61-66): The initial international response included a UN General Assembly resolution for a humanitarian truce in late October 2023 (p. 61). The US vetoed several UN Security Council resolutions calling for humanitarian pauses or ceasefires (p. 62). In December 2023, South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging violations of the Genocide Convention (p. 63). The ICJ issued provisional measures in January, March, and May 2024, ordering Israel to, among other things, prevent genocidal acts and enable humanitarian assistance (pp. 63-64). Several states filed declarations of intervention in the ICJ case (p. 65). In May 2024, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) applied for arrest warrants against Israeli and Hamas leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity; warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, then-Defense Minister Gallant, and Hamas military leader Mohammed Deif were issued in November 2024 (p. 65).
• 3.2.5 Israeli Settlement Expansion and Settler Violence (pp. 67-69): Since 7 October 2023, Israeli authorities rapidly advanced unlawful Jewish settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, through new seizure orders, demolition of Palestinian homes, and by backing or failing to prevent a dramatic increase in Israeli settler attacks against Palestinian farming and herding communities (p. 67). This led to significant Palestinian displacement (p. 67). The report notes the influence of ultra-nationalist, anti-Palestinian religious Zionist parties within the Israeli coalition government, led by ministers like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, who advocate for settlement expansion and have made inflammatory statements (pp. 67-68). Measures were taken that further consolidated de facto annexation and entrenched the apartheid system (p. 68-69).

2.1 SCOPE (pp. 39-43)

The report focuses on the Israeli authorities’ policies and actions in the occupied Gaza Strip (Gaza) in the context of the military offensive launched following the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups (p. 39). Its primary aim is to assess these actions within the framework of genocide under international law to determine if Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide (p. 39). This contributes to ongoing international debates and aims to stop/prevent genocidal acts in the short term, and support accountability in the long term (p. 39). The report builds on analyses by other entities like scholars, UN experts, and South Africa’s ICJ case, which have also examined Israel’s conduct through a genocide lens (p. 39).

To make a determination on genocide, Amnesty International (AI) examined:

• Whether Palestinians in Gaza constitute a protected group (national, ethnical, racial, or religious) under the Genocide Convention (p. 40).
• Three specific prohibited acts: “killing members of the group”; “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (p. 40).
• Whether Israel committed these acts with the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, [the] group, as such” (p. 40).
• The legal analysis was guided by extensive research on genocidal intent and engagement with external legal experts (p. 40).

This report builds on AI’s existing documentation of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) in Gaza, including previous findings on war crimes like direct and indiscriminate attacks, torture, wanton destruction, and collective punishment (p. 40). AI has previously concluded Israel’s system of oppression and domination against Palestinians amounts to the crime against humanity of apartheid (p. 41).

The research primarily covers the period between October 2023 and July 2024, focusing on the ground situation during this nine-month period (p. 41). Key overarching data (deaths, injuries, damage, food insecurity, displacement) were updated until late September or early October 2024, and analysis of relevant international commentary was updated until the end of November 2024 (p. 41). The report acknowledges that Israel’s offensive continued beyond this research period (p. 41).

The geographical scope is limited to Gaza, considering Palestinians in Gaza as a substantial part of the broader Palestinian group (p. 42). It does not address Israeli violations in the occupied West Bank (though these are subject to separate investigation) (p. 42). It also does not focus on the violations perpetrated by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups against Israelis on 7 October 2023, for which AI has published preliminary research and plans a forthcoming report (p. 42). However, it refers to violations by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups where their conduct is relevant to the report’s analysis of Israeli actions (p. 43). The legal assessment of genocide is under the framework of state responsibility, not individual criminal responsibility (p. 43).

2.2 METHODOLOGY (pp. 43-46)

2.2.1 RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (pp. 43-44) The report is based on field and desk research conducted between 7 October 2023 and early July 2024 (p. 43). AI’s requests for access to Gaza have been repeatedly rejected by Israeli authorities since 2012 (latest rejection 3 June 2024) and by Egyptian authorities for access via Rafah (latest request 24 October 2024) (p. 43).

AI interviewed 212 people (some multiple times) between October 2023 and September 2024, including:

• Palestinian victims, survivors, and witnesses of air strikes, displacement, detention, destruction of property, and impact of aid restrictions (p. 43).
• Members of local authorities in Gaza, Palestinian healthcare workers, and individuals involved in the humanitarian response (staff of international, Israeli, and Palestinian NGOs and UN agencies) (p. 43). Most interviews were conducted remotely (voice/video calls) with individuals in Gaza (one in Egypt), relying on trusted Gaza-based fieldworkers to identify and locate them, and sometimes to facilitate communication (p. 43). Interviews with Palestinian victims, witnesses, medical workers, and local authorities were in Arabic and translated by AI (p. 44).

AI analyzed an extensive range of visual and digital evidence (satellite imagery, videos, photos from social media or obtained directly), which were authenticated and, where possible, geolocated (p. 44). It reviewed numerous media reports, statements, datasets from UN agencies (OCHA, UNRWA, WHO), humanitarian organizations, and Palestinian/Israeli human rights groups (p. 44). Statements by senior Israeli government and military officials, COGAT, submissions to Israeli courts, and ICJ case material were also examined (p. 44). Oral statements were reviewed in their original language, with official English translations checked for discrepancies (p. 44).

2.2.2 ENGAGEMENT WITH ISRAELI AND HAMAS AUTHORITIES (pp. 45-46) AI repeatedly attempted to engage with Israeli authorities since October 2023 (p. 45).

• Submitted findings on 15 air strikes to the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) in five correspondences (Oct 2023 - May 2024) and renewed requests for information in October 2024 (p. 45).
• The October 2024 letter to the MoD also summarized findings on destruction of cultural/religious sites and conditions of life in Gaza (p. 45).
• Sent letters to the Knesset Speaker and Military Advocate General (MAG) (Feb 2024) regarding potentially genocidal or dehumanizing statements by Knesset members and military officers, with a follow-up to the MAG (Oct 2024) about soldier statements/conduct (p. 45).
• Sent a letter to the Israeli Attorney General (Oct 2024) regarding investigations into incitement by senior officials (p. 45).
• Sent a letter to the MAG (July 2024) regarding destruction of agricultural land and civilian buildings near the border fence (p. 46).
• Sent a request to COGAT (July 2024) for detailed data on humanitarian aid access (p. 46).
• No substantive responses were received from Israeli authorities by the time of publication (p. 46).

AI also wrote to Hamas authorities:

• To the Attorney General in Gaza (July 2024) regarding alleged presence of armed group fighters in IDP camps, and again (Oct 2024) requesting information on investigations into IHL violations by Palestinian armed groups (p. 46). No reply by publication (p. 46).
• To Hamas’s Political and International Relations Department (Oct 2024) sharing initial findings on Hamas fighters’ conduct in Gaza and requesting information on measures to protect civilians and investigate violations. A 10-page response was received on 13 November 2024, and key elements are reflected in the report (p. 46).

2.2.3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (p. 46) AI expressed gratitude to all participants, especially Palestinians in Gaza, and acknowledged the work of its fieldworkers under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions (p. 46).